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This contribution considers whether or not it is possible to devise a coherent form of ex-
ternal skepticism about the normative if we ‘relax’ about normative ontology by regarding 
claims about the existence of normative truths and properties themselves as normative. I 
answer this question in the positive: A coherent form of non-normative error-theories can 
be developed even against a relaxed background. However, this form no longer makes any 
reference to the alleged falsity of normative judgments, nor the non-existence of normative 
properties. Instead, it concerns a specifically inferentialist construal of error-theories which 
suggests that error-theorists should abstain from any claims about normative ontology to 
focus exclusively on claims about the inferential role of normative vocabulary. As I will 
show, this suggestion affords a number of important advantages. However, it also comes at 




Is it possible to devise a coherent form of external skepticism about the moral? Tradi-
tionally, there has been little doubt that we should answer this question in the affirma-
tive. After all, when declaring that all moral judgments are false because there are no 
moral properties, error-theorists have repeatedly stressed that they are putting forward a 
thesis about the moral domain, not one within it: they are, to use Mackie’s (1977: 15) 
famous formulation, making a metaphysical claim about the “fabric of the world”. 
However, this understanding has lately come under pressure from various directions. 
Ronald Dworkin (1996, 2011) was one of the first to challenge the possibility of de-
fending external skepticism about the moral, arguing that all skeptical stances about the 
existence of moral properties presuppose the truth of some positive moral judgment 
and must thus be understood as varieties of internal skepticism. Minimalist conceptions 
of truth, fact and property, which have recently stirred much debate in the wake of Ja-
mie Dreier’s (2004) problem of creeping minimalism, appear to suggest a similar con-
clusion by entailing that there is no substantive difference between asserting a moral 
claim, such as ‘Stealing is wrong’, and ascribing truth to this claim by asserting ‘It is true 
that stealing is wrong’. At the same time, so-called ‘relaxed’ moral realists such as Tim 
Scanlon (2014) stress that, contrary to philosophical lore, their claims about moral on-
tology must not be read as robustly metaphysical theses, but as moral commitments that 
are to be assessed on grounds of domain-internal, moral standards. But if relaxed moral 
realists’ endorsement of moral truths’ existence is now to be interpreted as a moral po-
sition, then surely error-theorists’ rejection of these very truths must be just as moral. If 
sound, this relaxed, non-metaphysical reading of moral ontology would spell serious 
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trouble for error-theories: were their claim that there are no moral truths itself moral, 
error-theories would not merely lose their robustly metaphysical status, but would be 
outright incoherent. 
 Although I will present considerations that aim to bestow some plausibility on 
these recent developments towards relaxed, non-metaphysical readings of moral truth 
claims, my primary concern here will not be whether or not we should indeed relax 
about moral ontology. Rather, I will investigate if, and if so how, a coherent, non-moral 
reading of error-theories could be available even if it were agreed that claims about the 
(non-)existence of moral properties are indeed moral. After all, much has been written 
on how minimalism’s non-metaphysical take on truth, fact and property may affect the 
debate between moral realists and expressivists; far less thought has been devoted to its 
implications for our understanding of error-theories. 
 In this contribution, I seek to address this imbalance. To lay my cards on the 
table, though, I do so even though I am not an error-theorist myself. Yet, whilst I be-
lieve that error-theories should be rejected, I also believe that it is of general interest 
whether or not external skepticism about the moral is at all possible. I will answer this 
question in the positive: a coherent form of external error-theories can indeed be de-
vised. However, this form no longer makes any reference to the alleged falsity of moral 
judgments and the non-existence of moral properties. Instead, it concerns a specifically 
inferentialist construal which suggests that error-theorists should abstain from any 
claims about moral ontology and focus exclusively on claims about the inferential role 
of moral vocabulary. Consequently, whereas error-theories have traditionally been taken 
to consist of a conceptual component, stating that moral discourse is centrally committed 
to some thesis T, and an ontological component, showing this thesis T to be false (Joyce 
2001: 5), this inferentialist construal will comprise only the conceptual element and 
abandon all ontological claims.  
 As I will show, this suggestion affords a number of important advantages. 
However, it also comes at a cost, in that it might change not only the letter, but also the 
spirit of traditional error-theories. As such, this paper can be understood as offering 
error-theorists a suggestion as to how the non-moral, external status of their position 
might be saved. Whether or not this proposal is one that error-theorists would want to 
accept, remains for them to decide.  
 The next section seeks to motivate a relaxed, non-metaphysical reading of moral 
ontology. As hinted above, the considerations presented will not construct a conclusive 
case for this relaxed stance, but are merely intended to provide sufficient grounds for 
making this moral reading plausible.1 Based on an error-theoretic counterargument to 
this relaxed interpretation, Section 3 will lay the foundations for developing  a form of 
skepticism which qualifies as external even if we relax about moral ontology. Section 4 
will spell out this inferentialist conception of error-theories in greater detail. Section 5 
will conclude by considering what error-theorists might gain, but also what they may 
lose, by adopting this modified understanding of their position. 
 For convenience’s sake, I will help myself to some stipulated terminology. The 
term ‘ontological’ will be applied to theses about the existence and nature of truths, 
facts and properties. As such, ‘moral ontology’ will comprise claims about the existence 
and nature of moral truths, facts and properties. ‘Metaphysical’, in turn, will be used 
more narrowly, in that I will reserve it for views that hold the truth of claims about 
                                                             
1 Given this focus on relaxed moral realism, I will not consider how error-theorists could or 
would seek to refute non-relaxed, metaphysical versions of moral realism. 
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moral ontology to be grounded on non-moral, metaphysical considerations. Metaphysi-
cal considerations will be understood as presupposing that there is a domain-neutral 
understanding for the concept of ‘existence’ as well as general existence conditions 
which apply equally across all domains. The relaxed position will then be taken to deny 
that such domain-neutral senses and criteria of existence are tenable. This paper thus 
presupposes a Carnapian distinction between internal questions that are asked within a 
framework or domain, and external questions that are posed about this domain,2 where 
moral considerations count as domain-internal and metaphysical considerations as do-
main-external.  
Despite the dislike that many of them share about this term, those advocating a 
moral, non-metaphysical reading of moral ontology will be called ‘relaxed philoso-
phers’. Amongst this relaxed camp, we can find a variety of different philosophers who, 
despite their agreement on moral interpretations of moral ontology, somewhat surpris-
ingly differ not only on how and why to relax about moral truths, but also on most 
other philosophical questions.3 Although I will follow Scanlon’s (2014) account most 
closely, my interpretation of relaxed realism will borrow from all these different ap-
proaches without suggesting that every relaxed philosopher will agree with everything I 
have to say on moral readings of moral ontology. Finally, in line with the specific focus 
of this volume on moral skepticism, I will understand error-theories locally, i.e. as en-
compassing the moral domain but not normative discourse more widely.4 Arguably, the 
difference between moral and normative error-theories impacts on how far-reaching 
relaxed critiques of error-theories are. Whenever it does so it will be indicated in the 
text.  
 
2. Relaxing about Moral Ontology 
Assume, then, that you hear philosophers asserting claims such as “There are no moral 
properties,” “Moral facts are sui generis,” or “Moral properties are mind-independent.” 
What kinds of claims are those philosophers propounding when defending these the-
ses? According to one very plausible reading, they are putting forward metaphysical 
claims, which assess the ontological foundation of the moral from a standpoint outside 
of the moral domain. Given this very intuitive categorization, why believe that claims 
about moral ontology are not metaphysical, but moral? Put differently, why leave meta-
physics behind and relax about moral ontology? 
 Relaxation is triggered by a diverse array of impulses—such as Hume’s Law, in-
terpretations of metaethical theses, or minimalism about truth, fact and property—, and 
all may have their role to play when rejecting metaphysical approaches to moral ontolo-
gy. Its main driver, though, concerns the way in which we are supposed to approach 
the very basic ontological question “What exists?”. Following our philosophical training 
or, maybe more charitably, our intuitive inclination, we may feel disposed to tackle this 
question by searching for some general criterion of existence which applies across all 
                                                             
2 Yet, it does so without endorsing Carnap’s (1950) own take on such an internal/external 
distinction. 
3 These include Thomas Nagel (1986), Ronald Dworkin (1996, 2011), Simon Blackburn 
(1998), Matthew Kramer (2009), Derek Parfit (2011), and Thomas Scanlon (2014).  
4 I do so despite generally agreeing with Streumer (forthcoming), and thus disagreeing with 
Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001), and Olson (2014), that error-theories cannot be understood as 
being confined to the moral domain only.  
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domains and settles whether or not a thing exists irrespective of the subject area in ques-
tion. For instance, assume that this criterion proclaimed that existence is conditioned 
on causal efficacy. If so, do genes exist? Yes, they do, because genes causally impact on 
how we look and how likely it is for us to contract cancer, say. Do numbers exist? No, 
they do not, because numbers are not causally efficacious. Or imagine that existence 
were tied to explanatory indispensability. If so, are there electrons? Yes, there are, be-
cause electrons are explanatorily indispensable. Are there moral properties? No, there 
are not, because we can do without them in our best explanations (or so many philoso-
phers argue). According to relaxed philosophers, despite such potential philosophical 
inclinations to the contrary, this general, domain-neutral approach to existence ques-
tions is fundamentally misguided: there are no general, substantive conditions of exist-
ence that would apply across all subject domains. Instead, existence questions can only 
ever be answered on grounds of the domain-internal standards that govern the respec-
tive subject matter. In order to justify the claim that electrons exist, say, the require-
ments of science will demand that electrons are causally and explanatorily efficacious. 
When determining whether or not there exists a Baroque age, though, we must not 
consult science, but need to draw on aesthetic theories, whereas it is moral considera-
tions on grounds of which we must answer questions about the existence of virtue, say. 
As Scanlon (2014: 25) puts it, we “make claims expressed by the existential quantifier in 
many domains, but what is required to justify any existential claim, and what follows 
from such a claim, varies, depending on the kind of thing that is claimed to exist.” Fur-
thermore, since the notion of existence is closely related to those of truth and fact, we 
can add that just as existence questions do not require domain-neutral, metaphysical 
enquiries, nor do questions of truth and fact: no matter whether we ask if an even 
prime number exists, or if it is true that there is some prime number which is even, or if 
it is a mathematical fact that there is an even prime number, we are thrown back to the 
mathematical question of whether or not some prime number is even.5 At no stage do 
metaphysical thoughts enter into these considerations. 
 Importantly, relaxing about ontology does not entail that there are no important 
ontological questions to be addressed. It does entail, though, that these questions are 
domain-specific, and as such can be answered neither on domain-neutral grounds, nor 
on the basis of the standards of some other domain.6 Just as importantly, once these 
                                                             
5 This obviously presupposes minimalist notions of truth and fact, according to which facts 
are no more than true propositions, where the proposition that p is true iff p. Compare also 
Blackburn’s (1998: 78) appeal to Ramsey’s ladder: “Because of … minimalism we can have for 
free what look[s] like a ladder of philosophical ascent: ‘p’, ‘it is true that p’, ‘it is really and truly a 
fact that p’ …, for none of these terms, in Ramsey’s view, marks an addition to the original 
judgement.” Some metaethicists have argued that although there are such minimalist notions of 
truth, fact, property and existence, these are neither the only possible understandings of these 
concepts, nor legitimate interpretations as far as ontological matters are concerned (cf. Hor-
gan/Timmons 2015). 
6 This leaves out a key qualification that Scanlon (2014: 19) proposes: namely, that some D-
proposition p is true iff D-specific standards entail p’s truth and p does not conflict with some 
other domain E. This ‘no-conflict clause’ is important, as it does allow for the relevance of 
domain-external standards for p’s truth if domain E has jurisdiction over p’s presuppositions. 
As such, a relaxed realist such as Scanlon does not just argue that the truth of moral claims is 
settled by moral standards, but also that (pure) moral claims, such as “Promoting happiness is 
good,” have no problematic presuppositions within any other domain. This is why, as I explain 
below, ontological and epistemological queerness arguments are counted as misguided if they 
mistakenly assume that moral discourse does possess such presuppositions which would make 
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domain-specific standards entail that virtue exists, or that claims about oceans and 
numbers are true, there is no further question as to whether virtue, oceans and numbers 
really exist and whether claims about them are really true. The very general existential 
question “What exists?,” then, is parasitic on specific, domain-internal existential ques-
tions such as “Are there numbers?,” “Are there tables?,” or “Are there reasons?”: we 
can answer the former only on grounds of answering the latter. Without the latter, we 
have no grip on the former. 
 Let us return to moral ontology, then, and consider a claim such as “It is a fact 
that happiness is good.” As has just been mentioned, this claim could just as easily be 
expressed by using the formulations “It is true that happiness is good,” “Happiness 
possesses the moral property of goodness,” or simply “Happiness is good”: given non-
metaphysical notions of truth, fact and property, we can slide seamlessly between these 
four claims without adding or subtracting any metaphysical content. How do we find 
out whether or not we are justified in committing ourselves to the goodness of happi-
ness? The way not to proceed is to start asking questions about the metaphysical nature 
of the property that is ascribed to happiness. That is, we should not declare that we 
would be justified in believing in the existence of goodness only if this seemingly 
‘queer’ property featured in our best causal explanations or could be placed within a 
natural world, or if there were some metaphysical relation ‘in the world’, as it is often 
put, that would make it true or explain the goodness of happiness. Doing so would 
amount to imposing illegitimately the standards of the natural domain to the moral 
domain, and thus misunderstand what it takes for moral ontological commitment to be 
justified. What we need to do instead is to engage in moral enquiry and consult our 
moral theories to find out whether or not happiness is indeed good. Importantly, if 
these moral considerations show that happiness is good, this settles that we are justified 
in committing ourselves to the goodness of happiness;7 to ask for further, metaphysical 
support for this ontological commitment would be to misconstrue what is required to 
justify claims such as “Goodness exists” or “Happiness has the property of goodness.”  
 Hence, if relaxed philosophers are right, metaphysically driven error-theories are 
mistaken: justification of moral ontological commitment does not depend on domain-
external, metaphysical considerations. Error-theorists’ skepticism is, therefore, either 
misguided if understood as an external position assessing moral ontological commit-
ment on grounds of domain-external, metaphysical standards, or must be re-interpreted 
as a form of internal skepticism that operates from within the moral domain. Either 
way, relaxing about moral ontology leaves external readings of error-theories in an 
awkward dilemma: its first horn pulls the rug from under error-theoretic attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
moral properties queer. Without arguing this point here, this ‘no-conflict clause’ helps relaxed 
realists to deal with objections of ontological proliferation, e.g. with regard to the existence of 
witches or magical elves. But it also caters for local error-theories, such as those rejecting moral 
but not normative truths: in this case, it is the normative domain which supposedly shows that 
the presuppositions of the moral domain are false (cf. n. 7 and 8). In this context, Joyce’s (2001: 
45–49) remarks on Carnap are particularly interesting, as they appear to accept that external 
skepticism about the moral domain presupposes the conceptual and normative framework of 
the domain of practical rationality. 
7 At this point a caveat is in order: For, it might be argued that even the truth of a claim 
such as “Happiness is good” is not settled by moral considerations alone, as it also has the nor-
mative presupposition that there are reasons which speak for happiness in a way that is required 
for this claim to be true, i.e. objective, categorical or irreducibly normative reasons. I return to 
this thought in n. 8. 
6 
 
reject moral truths, facts and properties on grounds of alleged metaphysical ‘queerness’ 
by showing that such metaphysical considerations do not apply to moral discourse; the 
second presupposes the truth of some moral consideration and thus renders them in-
coherent.8  
 Now, I appreciate that these previous paragraphs present relaxed views on exist-
ence, truth and fact, but do not argue for them. As such, they will hardly convince those 
philosophers who have already taken the firm stance that this relaxed approach must be 
rejected. However, as providing further arguments for relaxation would require us to 
involve ourselves in metaontological debate and thus take us too far afield, let me fol-
low Amie Thomasson (2007: 5) in appealing to those who are still somewhat neutral 
and open-minded about these questions. That is, let me ask the admittedly leading 
question: if you are inclined to endorse statements such as “It is wrong to read others’ 
diaries,” or “I ought to spend more time with my grannie,” and if you believe that the 
correct moral standards support claims such as these, what more would you possibly 
require also to endorse the ontological statements that there is the property of wrong-
ness, or that this obligation exists? If, as I hope that you would do, you answer “Noth-
ing,” you take a relaxed stance on moral ontology.  
 
3. Morality, Negations and the Opening of a Different Avenue 
However, an important objection to this relaxed project will most certainly have en-
tered error-theorists’ mind by now. This relies on a move which has gained so much 
support amongst error-theorists in recent years that it cannot be ignored here.9 Interest-
ingly, advocates of this move agree with relaxed philosophers that statements endorsing 
the existence of moral truths and facts are themselves moral; they might even agree that 
moral realism, proclaiming the existence of such moral truths and properties, is itself a 
moral position. At the same time, they contradict relaxed philosophers by declaring that 
denying the existence of moral truths and facts is not moral, just as the statement “Moral 
realism is false” does not express a moral judgment (Streumer forthcoming: ch. 8). This 
arguably rather surprising move is built on two key components. The first disputes that 
moral discourse is closed under negation. That is, although the claim 
 
(M) Making others unhappy is wrong 
 
                                                             
8 In n. 7, I have indicated that the truth of a claim such as “Happiness is good” arguably has 
the normative presupposition that there are objective reasons. This, in turn, allows local error-
theorists such as Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001) and Olson (2014) to submit that this moral claim 
is false because its normative presupposition is false: There are no such reasons. If tenable, this 
would indeed be a form of external, albeit normative, skepticism that even relaxed philosophers 
would recognize as such. However, they would reject this form of external skepticism as soon as 
it is based on the metaphysical objection that such objective reasons would be “metaphysically 
mysterious” (Olson 2014: 136). Accordingly, although error-theories which encompass the 
moral but not the normative could qualify as a form of external skepticism about the moral, the 
way in which they are generally developed also mistakenly assumes that moral claims have false 
metaphysical presuppositions, and thus succumb to the first horn. Still, the dilemma presented 
here admittedly is stronger in the case of normative error-theories than in that of local, moral 
error-theories. 




is moral—just as the corresponding claims “(M) is true,” “(M) states a moral fact” or 
“Generating unhappiness possesses the moral property of wrongness” are moral—its 
negation 
 
(¬M)  Making others unhappy is not wrong, 
 
together with the corresponding claims that (M) is false, or that there is no moral fact 
that making others unhappy is wrong, or that generating unhappiness does not possess 
the property of wrongness, are not moral. 
 Its second component provides the explanation of why (¬M) is not moral: for a 
claim to qualify as such, it must conceptually entail that something satisfies a moral 
predicate (Streumer forthcoming) or, put differently, that some moral property is as-
cribed to some object of evaluation. Of course, (M) satisfies this requirement and is, 
therefore, moral; however, negations such as (¬M) do not. And since error-theorists’ 
core thesis just is that there are no moral truths or properties, and thus that no moral 
predicate is ever satisfied, we can conclude that contrary to relaxed philosophers’ claim, 
error-theories are not moral even if moral realism and the endorsement of moral proper-
ties’ existence were indeed moral.10 
 As it stands, I do not believe that this error-theoretic move succeeds. However, 
it might still point error-theorists in the right direction. Before coming to these positive 
implications, though, let us start with the negative part and ask why this retort is not 
strong enough to refute relaxed philosophers. One way to show as much would be to 
question the claim that (¬M) does not conceptually entail that some moral predicate is 
satisfied. After all, does (¬M) not conceptually imply that making others unhappy is 
permissible, and thus that there is at least one moral property which is indeed instanti-
ated? Error-theorists have recently started to block this train of thought by arguing that 
whilst ‘not wrong’ conversationally implicates ‘permissible’, no conceptual entailment relations 
hold between these predicates. If so, (¬M) would implicate, but not conceptually entail 
that the predicate ‘permissible’ is satisfied, and would thus retain its non-moral classifi-
cation.  
Although I find this appeal to conversational implicatures problematic, I will not 
join the controversy about conceptual entailments between ‘not wrong’ and ‘permissi-
ble’ here. Instead, let me hint at a second way to attack this error-theoretic move, which 
questions that in order for some claim to qualify as moral, it must entail satisfaction of a 
moral predicate or ascription of some moral property. To motivate these qualms, take 
the statement 
 
(U)  X is impermissible iff X generates less utility than some alternative Y. 
 
I assume that many—although certainly not all—would agree that (U) is at least very 
naturally read as a moral claim. Yet, (U) itself does not ascribe a moral property, nor 
                                                             
10 Note that if successful, this move would render it unnecessary to limit error-theories’ the-
sis to positive moral claims only, as for instance suggested by Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). That 
is, error-theorists could keep proclaiming that all moral claims are false without risking incoher-
ence, as it would be fully consistent to endorse the truth of the non-moral claim (¬M) whilst 
proclaiming the falsity of the moral claim (M). This is a significant advantage over interpreta-
tions which understand error-theoretic theses as being limited to positive moral claims only, as 




conceptually entail that some moral predicate is satisfied. Consequently, it does not 
qualify as moral on the error-theorist’s count. Or consider the example  
 
(¬E)  Phlogiston does not exist. 
 
Again, I presume that many would agree that (¬E) is an empirical claim. Assuming, 
though, that the error-theorist’s categorization criterion applies tout court, in that for 
some statement to count as D, it must conceptually entail that some D-predicate is sat-
isfied, (¬E) would fail to qualify as empirical as it does not ascribe an empirical proper-
ty, nor conceptually entail that some other empirical predicate is satisfied. Of course, 
error-theorists might be willing to accept these categorizations of (U) and (¬E) as not 
moral and not empirical respectively.11 However, given their counter-intuitive flavor, 
they would do so at some theoretical cost. 
 Assume, then, that we wanted to classify (¬E) as empirical although it does not 
ascribe any empirical property. Since the error-theorists’ preferred categorization crite-
rion cannot help us in this respect, it is clear that we must replace it with some other 
criterion. Here is one such alternative: (¬E) is empirical because its truth is determined 
by empirical methods and scientific standards. That is, (¬E) has empirical status be-
cause it is based on considerations such as the following: Its truth must be examined on 
grounds of observations and experiments; this includes appeal to scientific theories; for 
our belief in phlogiston’s existence to be justified, phlogiston would have to be explana-
torily indispensable and causally efficacious; (¬E) can conflict with other empirical 
claims, and so on. Put differently, (¬E) is very plausibly categorized as empirical be-
cause it is based on and governed by scientific norms. Could we apply the same 
thoughts to (U)? Arguably yes: (U) is so naturally understood as moral because its truth 
must be examined by moral reasoning about the link between impermissibility and utili-
ty maximization, because (U) can explain why certain actions would not be justified, 
because it has the ability to guide our deliberation about what to do, because it con-
cerns our actions towards others, because it cannot be confirmed by observation and 
experiments, because (U) might follow from or have implications for other moral 
claims, and so on. Arguably, then, (U) is very naturally characterized as moral because it 
is based on and governed by moral norms.12   
 What about (¬M)? On the one hand, the same considerations apply: Contrary 
to error-theorists’ claim, (¬M) is very plausibly sorted into moral discourse because it is 
naturally understood as the conclusion of moral reflections, even if it does not entail 
satisfaction of some moral predicate. On the other hand, we should not forget that 
language can be used very flexibly, so that we certainly ought to beware of believing 
that negations such as (¬M) can only ever be understood as first-order, moral claims. As 
Plunkett and Sundell (2013) convincingly argue, claims such as (M) and (¬M) could, for 
instance, also be used metalinguistically, e.g., as making claims about how moral con-
cepts ought to be used, what their presuppositions are, to which objects they can mean-
                                                             
11 If, in turn, they wanted to categorize (¬E) as empirical but (¬U) and (¬M) as non-moral, 
they would have to introduce different categorization criteria for different domains, only some 
of which prescribed satisfaction of some D-predicate. How plausible this move would be can-
not be considered here. 
12 How do we know which standards are moral and, more generally, what characterizes the 
moral domain? This is a very difficult question which relaxed realists cannot shirk from ad-
dressing. However, as it would take us too far afield, I will, admittedly disappointingly, continue 
to rely on an intuitive understanding of the moral domain here. 
9 
 
ingfully applied, etc. That is, when declaring that a flower’s turning towards the light is 
not virtuous, it would be rather uncharitable of me to understand you as having come 
to some substantive moral conclusion about this flower’s moral character; instead, it 
would make far more sense to read your claim as communicating that we would com-
mit a category mistake if we applied the term ‘virtuous’ to flowers.13 Consequently, even 
though it is extremely plausible to read claims such as (¬M) as moral, it seems that they 
need not necessarily be so interpreted. 
 If so, we might draw two lessons from this error-theoretic counterargument to 
relaxed readings of moral ontology. Firstly, when determining how to categorize state-
ments such as (¬M), it would be far too quick to conclude that (¬M) is not moral be-
cause it does not ascribe any moral property, just as it would be far too quick to read 
(¬M) as a moral claim because it can be so interpreted. Instead, in line with relaxed phi-
losophers’ general approach, we need to determine in which context—i.e. within which 
domain and on which grounds—(¬M) is defended and put forward.  
 Secondly, even if it were agreed that (¬M) can be used to convey different in-
formation and carry non-literal content, this would not necessarily disprove relaxed 
philosophers’ take on moral ontology. Whether or not it would depends on which in-
formation is supposed to be communicated by the use of (¬M). After all, if (¬M) relays 
information which it does not ‘wear on its sleeve’, it should be possible to explicate this 
information by use of some other claim, the nature of which is then open to debate. 
For instance, imagine that when you utter (M) and I utter (¬M), we should not be un-
derstood as disagreeing about the moral status that some specific moral theory ascribes to 
generating unhappiness (on this we agree), but about which moral theory correctly 
specifies the application conditions of ‘wrong’. So let us say that by endorsing (M), you 
communicate something along the very rough lines of “Hedonists are right,” whereas I 
use (¬M) to convey “Hedonists are wrong.” Since these further, implicitly communi-
cated claims are also moral, it is clear that we would not have left moral discourse even 
if (M) and (¬M) were interpreted as expressing claims about the application conditions 
of ‘wrong’. Consequently, referring to the possibility of non-literal uses of (¬M) does 
not settle the debate in error-theorists’ favor, but simply expands it to the status of the 
claims that are implicitly conveyed. And if these tacitly communicated claims concerned 
once more error-theorists’ traditional theses, we would be back to square one: relaxed 
philosophers will object that these error-theoretic claims are either misguided or do-
main-internal.  
 Consequently, this recent error-theoretic attempt to establish non-moral catego-
rizations of claims such as (¬M) and “There are no moral truths” is not sufficient to 
rebut relaxed readings of moral ontology. However, these last remarks on metalinguistic 
uses of (¬M) might still point error-theorists in the right direction. For, if error-
theorists could shift focus from metaphysical concerns about the property of wrongness 
to metasemantic enquiries into moral concepts such as ‘wrongness’, new avenues might 
indeed open up, although error-theorists would have to be careful about how to devel-
op them. One way of doing so will be presented next. 
 
                                                             
13 Some relaxed realists, such possibly as Kramer (2009), might point out that identification 
of category mistakes also relies on moral considerations, in that it is they which show why flow-
ers are no suitable objects for moral assessment. I prefer reading category mistakes in concep-
tual terms, in that someone who sincerely applies terms such as ‘virtuous’ to flowers is not a 
competent user of moral language. 
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4. From Metaphysics to Metasemantics 
I have briefly mentioned above that error-theories generally comprise a conceptual 
component—for instance, proclaiming that moral discourse is committed to the exist-
ence of irreducibly normative favoring relations—and an ontological claim—in this 
case, that no such irreducibly normative favoring relations exist. In addition, I have not 
so much argued as stated that according to relaxed philosophers, error-theorists’ onto-
logical thesis is either misguided if based on domain-external, metaphysical criteria 
which are wrongly applied to moral ontological commitment, or must be re-interpreted 
as a form of internal skepticism. Assume that relaxed philosophers are right: whether or 
not there are moral truths is a moral question. Is there some way in which error-
theories could still be understood as a form of external skepticism? 
 If we want to give a positive answer, the way forward seems to be clear: if error-
theories’ ontological component is not suited to establish external status, moral ontolo-
gy should be left behind and conceptual matters should move to the fore. Indeed, this 
step should not feel unusual to error-theorists. To start with, not all error-theories are 
(purely) metaphysically driven: identifying some thesis that is central to a discourse, say 
about irreducible normativity, and then arguing that this thesis is false because irreduci-
bly normative reasons would be metaphysically queer, is one way to develop an error-
theory, but not the only way. Rather, error-theories can also be built on considerations 
of incoherence, propounding that moral thinking is flawed because it involves built-in 
contradictions. This is how Michael Smith (2010) interprets Mackie’s claim that con-
ceiving of moral truths as both objective and prescriptive is incoherent; arguably, it is 
also how Streumer’s (forthcoming: §30) argument, suggesting that moral properties 
would have to be both identical and non-identical to descriptive properties, could at 
least in part be understood.14 Focusing on such conceptual matters is, therefore, certain-
ly not new to error-theorists, although relaxing about moral ontology will restrict how 
exactly this shift towards conceptual considerations can be fleshed out. 
 Nor is it new to modify our understanding of metaethical accounts in the wake 
of non-metaphysical accounts of semantic vocabulary such as truth, fact and represen-
tation. Most instructively, take the case of expressivism as an example: loosely put, pre-
minimalism expressivism has traditionally been understood as a combination of the 
positive thesis that the meaning of moral claims is to be explained by appeal to the con-
ative mental states expressed, and the negative thesis that there are no moral truths and 
facts. Given minimalist understandings of truth and fact, though, expressivists no long-
er want to deny that moral truths and facts exist. Post-minimalism conceptions of ex-
pressivism have thus undergone two developments. Firstly, their negative thesis has 
been dropped, so that expressivism is now characterized exclusively by its positive the-
sis about the meaning of moral vocabulary. Questions about the existence of moral 
truths and facts, in turn, are—fully in line with relaxed accounts of moral ontology—
understood as domain-internal, moral queries. Hence, whilst expressivists such as Si-
mon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard endorse the existence of moral truths and facts as 
participants of moral discourse, this endorsement does not form part of their distinctive 
metaethical account. Secondly, expressivism is more and more understood not as a se-
mantic theory which specifies the meaning of moral claims, but as a metasemantic theo-
ry, which considers by virtue of what it is that moral claims come to possess their re-
spective conceptual content. This, in turn, is a question which expressivists answer 
                                                             
14 However, in contrast to the inferentialist account to be developed shortly, Streumer’s ac-
count does rely on important metaphysical considerations (cf. n. 20 below). 
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without using any of the referring expressions from moral discourse. Consequently, 
given this new, exclusive focus on their positive metasemantic thesis, neither minimal-
ism about truth and fact nor relaxing about moral ontology undermine expressivism’s 
status as a distinctive domain-external, metaethical theory. 
 Hence, if error-theorists could take a page out of expressivists’ book and adapt 
this expressivist strategy to their own cause, they should stand a good chance of secur-
ing external status for their own position, too. If so, they need to provide, firstly, a dis-
tinctive metasemantic account of moral language which, secondly, secures the error-
theoretic spirit and, thirdly, does so without employing metaphysically driven argu-
ments about moral truths and properties.  
 The inferentialist account that I will present next is certainly not the only way in 
which these criteria could be met. However, drawing on an inferentialist theory of 
meaning is, I believe, particularly well suited to do so. Accordingly, I will first give an 
extremely terse overview of those inferentialist elements which are relevant for my pro-
ject; I will then reject an inferentialist suggestion as to how error-theories could be un-
derstood; finally, I will present how I believe inferentialist error-theories should be de-
veloped. 
 
4.1 Inferentialism, and How Not to Construe Error-Theories 
According to inferentialism’s central metasemantic thesis, statements possess their spe-
cific conceptual content by virtue of the inferential role which they assume within the 
practice of making statements and asking for reasons (Brandom 1994). This inferential 
role includes the fact that statements can license as well as be licensed by other claims; 
that is, they can function as premises as well as conclusions of material inferences. At 
the same time, these claims are not only marked by their inferential relations to other 
claims, but also by non-inferential relations to certain non-linguistic phenomena outside 
the language game. On the one hand, these concern perceptions and observations 
which are non-inferentially linked to observation reports such as “This cup is red,” and 
thus provide input to the language game through so-called language entry transitions. On 
the other hand, these non-linguistic phenomena pertain to actions, which are non-
inferentially related to practical commitments such as “I shall spend the day with my 
nephews,” and can thus be understood as output of the language game that follow from 
language exit transitions (Brandom 1994: 234–235). Those claims which are partially 
characterized by language entry transitions, we can call doxastic or theoretical; those which 
are partially characterized by language exit transitions, we can call practical. Finally, dif-
ferent vocabularies are associated with different functions, in that they allow us to do 
different things within the game of giving and asking for reasons. For instance, obser-
vation reports such as “The sun shines today” enable language entry transitions by re-
porting our reliable discriminative reactions to our environment (Williams 2013). Other 
vocabularies have a very different, expressive function in that they allow us to render 
inferential roles explicit which would otherwise remain implicit. Take logical vocabulary 
as an example: although it is implicit in our inferential practices that the commitment 
“Humphrey is a dog” licenses and requires the commitment “Humphrey is an animal,” 
we cannot talk about this inferential relation unless we are in possession of logical vo-
cabulary that explicates this inference by stating “If Humphrey is a dog, then he is an 
animal.” Inferentialists are, therefore, pragmatists: in order to grasp the significance of 




Hence, if inferentialism is to help us develop a new perspective on metaethics, we 
need to understand metaethical accounts as carving out distinctive, competing theses 
about moral vocabulary within this inferentialist framework. Matthew Chrisman (2008: 
353), who is arguably the most vocal supporter of inferentialist metaethics, suggests the 
following characterizations15:  
 
Inferentialist Expressivism:  Moral claims express practical commitments. 
 
Inferentialist Moral Realism:  Moral claims express theoretical commitments 
and some of them are true. 
 
Inferentialist Error-Theories:  Moral claims express theoretical commitments 
and none of them is true.  
 
One advantage of these inferentialist metaethical understandings is the close proximity 
to their traditional counterparts: inferentialist error-theories differ from inferentialist 
expressivists in that they agree with inferentialist moral realists on how the meaning of 
moral vocabulary is to be explained, yet disagree with inferentialist moral realists about 
the existence of moral truths. As such, this proposal preserves the orthodox view that 
error-theorists and moral realists both concur that moral claims are purportedly representa-
tional and that moral content is to be explained representationally, whilst only the latter 
additionally believe that these claims represent successfully, i.e. that some of them are 
true. However, as should be evident from the explanations given above, this seeming 
advantage turns out to be a significant disadvantage if relaxed moral ontology is pre-
supposed as the background of our discussion. For, if the existence of moral truths and 
successful representation continued to shoulder the burden of demarcating moral real-
ism from error-theories within this inferentialist framework, we would just find our-
selves back with the relaxed philosophers’ thesis that questions of successful represen-
tation are to be settled on moral grounds. If successful representation constituted the 
sole bone of contention between inferentialist error-theorists and moral realists, there-
fore, they would disagree on domain-internal grounds only, but would be metaethically 
indistinguishable with regard to their metasemantic account of moral content. Conse-
quently, this first inferentialist take establishes error-theories neither as a distinctive 
metaethical position, nor as a form of external skepticism, and thus fails to advance the 
debate. 
 Accordingly, if inferentialism is supposed to help secure error-theories’ external 
status, we need a more radical departure from traditional metaethical understandings 
than this first inferentialist suggestion can provide. This means that inferentialist error-
theories must differ from moral realism not with regard to moral existential theses, but 
in relation to their metasemantic account of moral vocabulary. And this implies that in 
order to carve out a distinctive domain-external position, error-theorists need to pre-
sent metasemantic theses which, firstly, differ both from realist and expressivist sugges-
tions, secondly, capture the core error-theoretic thesis that something is amiss in moral 
discourse and, thirdly, do so without falling back on metaphysical assumptions about 
moral ontology. 
                                                             
15 This is a slight modification of Chrisman’s (2008) proposal, in that Chrisman considers 
ethical statements and offers a slightly different account of theoretical and practical commit-
ment. In a later paper, Chrisman (2011) proposes a suggestion based on explanatory considera-
tions. For more details, see my (2016). 
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4.2 Inferentialist Error-Theory as External Skepticism 
When tackling this task, it is helpful to start once more with error-theorists’ metaethical 
competitors. To bring out expressivists’ and moral realists’ metasemantic theses more 
clearly, let us furthermore follow recent suggestions within the creeping minimalism 
debate that associate expressivism with non-representationalism, and moral realism 
with representationalism. Transposed into an inferentialist key, this means that both 
moral realists and expressivists agree that meaning is explained by inferential role, yet 
disagree on what the inferential role of moral vocabulary consists in: 
 
Non-Representationalism:  Moral vocabulary is expressive. 
 
Representationalism:  Moral vocabulary is non-expressive.  
 
According to inferentialist expressivists, moral vocabulary falls into the same category 
as the logical terms mentioned above: it makes inferential relations explicit which would 
otherwise remain implicit (Brandom 1994). At the same time, it differs from other ex-
pressive vocabularies such as logical terms, in that it makes specific inferences explicit. 
These are practical inferences, which have doxastic commitments as their premises and 
practical commitments as their conclusions.16 To elaborate, when examining the intri-
cate web of inferential relations together with non-inferential language exit and entry 
transitions, inferentialist expressivists explain that we can observe that inferences from 
doxastic statements, such as “Visiting one’s grandmother makes her happy,” to practi-
cal commitments, such as “I shall visit my grandmother,” are generally endorsed as 
materially good inferences. Moreover, we can observe that we are clearly able to act on 
the basis of these practical commitments, namely by visiting our grandmothers more 
often. However, expressivists will stress that what we cannot do is talk about these in-
ferential relations, unless we possess special terms to do so. These terms, inferentialist 
expressivists now tell us, are moral concepts: it is they which allow us to formulate 
statements such as “Visiting one’s grandmother is good,” and thus to put into language 
and speak about what already exists in our practices but has so far remained implicit. 
Obviously, this expressivist suggestion requires further clarification and could be spelt 
out in different ways. However, its core idea should be clear: moral vocabulary expli-
cates practical inferences. Consequently, if there were no such inferences to be explicat-
ed, inferentialist expressivists conclude, we would not speak in moral terms. 
 Adopting a representationalist stance, inferentialist moral realists disagree: moral 
vocabulary is not expressive. As such, they submit that inferentialist expressivists 
wrongly describe our practices when claiming that moral vocabulary explicates what is 
already an implicit component of the inferentialist web. For, when we look at the vast 
mesh of inferences, we can observe that inferences from statements such as “Visiting 
one’s grandmother makes her happy” to “I shall visit my grandmother” are not generally 
regarded as sound, unless it is also thought that we are entitled to the claim “Visiting 
one’s grandmother is good because it makes her happy.” If we take away this premise, 
entitlement to the inference is generally held to collapse. Hence, a statement such as 
“Visiting one’s grandmother is good” does not explicate an already existing sound infer-
ence, but provides a premise without which no sound inference would exist. Hence, 
moral vocabulary is not expressive, or so inferentialist moral realists conclude. Instead, 
                                                             
16 For simplicity’s sake, I follow Brandom (1994) here. For an alternative inferentialist ac-
count, see Chrisman (2016). 
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it is characterized by its link to language entry transitions: rather than making explicit 
what is already there, it provides new input to the language game.  
 Again, much more would need to be said to flesh out exactly what this inferen-
tialist construal of representationalism involves.17 However, what these very rough  
overviews have hopefully shown is that inferentialist expressivists and moral realists 
offer very different accounts of moral vocabulary, with the former linking it to expres-
sive functions and the latter associating it with language-entry transitions. At the same 
time, I have argued that in order to secure external status and qualify as a distinctive 
metaethical account, inferentialist error-theorists must depart from traditional error-
theorists more radically by rejecting not just expressivists’ non-representationalism, but 
also moral realists’ representationalism: if they kept concurring with moral realists that 
moral claims are purportedly representational and disagreed only with regard to suc-
cessful representation, their disagreement would be domain-internal, not external. But if 
inferentialist error-theorists are barred from adopting representationalism and non-
representationalism, what is there possibly left for them to argue? Well, they could 
claim that both inferential moral realists and expressivists are mistaken in thinking that 
the inferential role of moral vocabulary can be coherently specified in the first place. 
More precisely, they could hold that: 
 
Inferentialist Error-Theories*:  The inferential role of moral claims is inco-
herent. 
 
What could this incoherence comprise? Obviously, it will be up to inferentialist error-
theorists to fill in the details. Still, Michael Williams’s (2013) suggestion of explaining 
vocabularies on grounds of so-called ‘EMUs’—explanations of meaning in terms of 
use—may give us a hint as to how error-theorists might proceed.  
EMUs comprise three different components:  
 
(I)  A material-inferential (intra-linguistic) component, specifying the inferential 
patterns in which a concept C stands. 
 
(E)  An epistemological component, detailing epistemological demands imposed 
on C-claims. 
 
(F)  A functional component, determining C’s function. 
 
(I) and (E) capture how certain terms are used, and thus arguably specify their conceptu-
al content; (F) makes explicit what they are used for. Accordingly, error-theorists could 
establish incoherence in at least two different ways. Firstly, they could argue that it is 
impossible to provide coherent (I)- and (E)-clauses of moral vocabulary. For instance, 
they could seek to establish that when engaging in moral discourse, we necessarily enter 
                                                             
17 This is by no means an easy feat. One possible suggestion, which has recently gained 
some currency, suggests that this inferentialist form of representationalism may involve explain-
ing moral vocabulary on the basis of our discriminative reactions to our moral environment, or 
maybe on grounds of certain explanatory theses (Chrisman 2011). Partly for the reasons men-
tioned below, I believe that it is extremely difficult—if not impossible!—for relaxed realists to 
be representationalists. Hence, it might well be the case that moral realists face a choice: either 
endorse representationalism and accept a robust form of realism, or relax about moral truths 
and defend non-representationalism. 
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commitments which are central to moral discourse but contradictory, in that entering 
one of these commitments is held necessarily to preclude entitlement to another. For 
instance, take moral discourse and the skepticism some error-theorists harbor about 
categorical normativity. Translated into inferentialist terminology, error-theorists could 
proffer the thesis that moral discourse commits us to the following triad of incompati-
ble claims:  
 
(1)  Moral commitments are practical commitments.  
(2) Practical commitments are treated as carrying entitlement iff they form the 
conclusion of a practical inference which is entitlement-preserving for a spe-
cific interlocutor on grounds of her particular preferences or social status. 
(3) Moral commitments are treated as carrying entitlement iff they form the 
conclusion of a practical inference which is entitlement-preserving for any 
interlocutor, irrespective of her preferences or social status. 
 
This suggestion should sound familiar: it emulates Joyce’s (2001) error-theoretic argu-
ment. Hence, if inferentialist error-theorists could convincingly argue that we are in-
deed centrally committed to all three claims, there would be no coherent way for us to 
engage in moral discourse: commitment to any two of these claims necessarily pre-
cludes entitlement to the remaining third. As such, no consistent (I)- and (E)-clauses of 
moral vocabulary would be possible. 
 The second way to spell out incoherence departs from such better-known error-
theoretic approaches by not targeting (I) and (E), but (F). As such, it does not point out 
allegedly inconsistent positions to which we commit ourselves within the language 
game, but questions the possibility to provide a coherent account of moral vocabulary’s 
very function. Above, we have encountered two competing accounts of moral vocabu-
lary’s (F)-clause: inferentialist moral realists maintain that moral terms are used for lan-
guage-entry moves, whereas inferentialist expressivists hold that they are used to make 
implicit practical inferences explicit. Inferentialist error-theorists could now submit that 
both are wrong: neither realists’ nor expressivists’ proposed (F)-clause is tenable. Let us 
begin with realists’ representationalism, and thus the claim that moral vocabulary facili-
tates language-entry transitions by allowing us to adopt positions within the language-
game in response to our environment. How could error-theorists attack this account? 
They could start by pointing out that the paradigmatic example for language-entry tran-
sitions concerns observation reports such as “This cup is red”: employing the term ‘red’ 
enables us to express the reactions we have when seeing things that are red. As this 
shows, though, language-entry transitions are crucially to do with perception and ob-
servation, and thus causation.18 However, when relaxing about moral ontology, relaxed 
philosophers themselves have argued that causal considerations are inappropriate within 
the moral context: to think otherwise, they have explained, is to misapply requirements 
that are adequate within the natural domain to the moral domain. Accordingly, taking 
relaxed philosophers at their word, inferentialist error-theorists could smartly highlight 
that if relaxed philosophers are right in claiming that causal considerations do not apply 
within the moral domain, and if the language-entry transitions featuring in moral real-
ists’ suggested (F)-clause presuppose causal relations, then their own relaxed stance on 
moral ontology precludes the representationalist (F)-clause that moral realists suggest 
                                                             
18 Indeed, according to inferentialists, it is this that bestows empirical content to observation 
reports (Brandom 1994: 234). 
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within their metasemantic account: without causal relations, moral vocabulary cannot 
facilitate language-entry transitions.19 This leaves expressivists’ non-representationalism, 
holding moral vocabulary to explicate what is already implicit in our inferential practic-
es. Yet, with regard to this functionalist thesis, inferentialist error-theorists can appro-
priate realists’ criticism of expressivism by agreeing that it simply is not the case that we 
endorse certain inferences as good and then merely explicate these moves by using 
moral claims. On this, inferentialist realists are right: moral premises do not make infer-
ences explicit, they make them sound. Hence, if it were the case that making others 
happy is good, we could indeed license our practical commitment to visit our grand-
mothers on grounds of the doxastic commitment that doing so would make them hap-
py; otherwise, this doxastic commitment would confer no such entitlement to the prac-
tical commitment. Consequently, although some vocabularies may be expressive, infer-
entialist error-theorists could conclude that moral vocabulary is not one of them. If so, 
moral vocabulary can neither be understood on the basis of language-entry transitions, 
as inferentialist moral realists would claim, nor on grounds of expressive functions, as 
inferentialist expressivists would have it. As such, the function of moral vocabulary 
remains obscure: there is no (F)-clause that could coherently specify it.   
 Of course, I do not mean to suggest here that either of these error-theoretic 
strands of thought is sufficiently spelt out. Nor do I want to claim that either argument 
is successful: as I said at the outset, I am not an error-theorist. However, if they could 
be made to work, we would have found a coherent form of external skepticism: Firstly, 
this second take on inferentialist error-theories differs both from realist and expressivist 
accounts of moral language and assumes, therefore, a distinctive position on a domain-
external, metasemantic question. Secondly, it captures the characteristic error-theoretic 
thrust that moral discourse is fundamentally flawed, in that we cannot provide a coher-
ent account of moral vocabulary. Hence, whereas non-inferentialist error-theorists may 
have claimed that the idea of moral properties is incoherent in that such properties 
would have to be both objective and prescriptive, inferentialist error-theorists maintain 
that moral vocabulary is defective since no consistent account of its inferentialist role is 
available. As a by-product, this revised understanding of inferentialist error-theories 
thus also attacks a crucial premise of the relaxed approach to moral ontology, namely 
that moral discourse is a well-disciplined domain that is governed by coherent stand-
ards, which provide the grounds on which the truth-values of moral existential claims 
are assessed. By adopting the inferentialist approach suggested here, error-theorists 
argue that this is false: the moral domain cannot be coherently reconstructed. Thirdly, it 
establishes as much on the basis of inquiries into the conceptual role of moral concepts, 
and thus without drawing on metaphysical, domain-external considerations about moral 
ontology: linking moral vocabulary with language-entry transitions has not been ruled 
out on grounds of alleged metaphysical queerness, say, but by appeal to relaxed philos-
ophers’ own take on moral ontology.20 Nor have metaphysical considerations featured 
when rejecting moral terms’ allegedly expressive function. 
                                                             
19 Do relaxed moral realists have to provide a metasemantic account of moral language? As 
he has indicated in personal conversation, Scanlon does not appear to think so. However, I 
believe that this position is not tenable. Without arguing this point here, I hold that relaxed 
moral realists need to draw on metasemantic theses to deal with several challenges to their posi-
tion, such as those to do with domain-individuation and ontological proliferation. 
20 Arguably, in this respect it differs from Streumer’s (forthcoming: ch. 2) incoherence ar-
gument, which is partly based on metaphysical considerations about property-identity. 
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 Consequently, this specific inferentialist understanding of error-theories neither 
proffers a form of representationalism, nor is defined by negative theses on successful 
representation. As such, it emulates expressivists’ strategy by characterizing the error-
theoretic position in purely metasemantic, non-ontological terms. However, in contrast 
to expressivists, who combine their distinctive metasemantic account of moral vocabu-
lary with the domain-internal endorsement of moral truths and facts, inferentialist er-
ror-theorists eschew all claims on moral ontology. Relaxed moral ontology and non-
metaphysical, minimalist conceptions of truth and fact can, therefore, pose no threat to 
the distinctive, external status of error-theories. Consequently, the suggested inferential-
ist understanding of error-theories puts error-theorists back on the metaethical map 
without any risk of drawing them back within the moral domain. 
 
5. Inferentialist Error-Theories: Gains and Losses 
How happy should error-theorists be about this inferentialist turn? Admittedly, this is 
not quite clear. For, whilst this inferentialist proposal comes with certain advantages, it 
also incurs non-negligible costs.  
 Starting with its advantages, most importantly for our purposes, this inferential-
ist construal secures error-theories’ status as a distinctive form of external skepticism 
even if it were granted to relaxed philosophers that moral ontology is itself moral. 
Moreover, despite no longer mentioning moral truths and properties, nor successful or 
purported representation—indeed, despite not even using moral vocabulary—this char-
acterization aims to retain the spirit, albeit not the letter, of error-theories by showing 
that moral discourse is fundamentally flawed. Finally, by eschewing all theses about 
moral truths, this re-construal of error-theories also delivers the positive side-effect that 
error-theorists no longer need to worry about the charge that their position cannot be 
consistently formulated. That is, whereas incoherence loomed with regard to traditional 
definitions in terms of the non-existence of moral truths, which lead either to error-
theoretic theses’ being limited to positive moral propositions only or to the thoughts on 
implicatures briefly discussed above, no such problems arise with regard to the suggest-
ed inferentialist understanding. 
 Turning to its costs, though, it is clear that although this inferentialist character-
ization seeks to be true to error-theories’ spirit, it cannot capture it entirely. After all, 
error-theories’ distinctive claim has traditionally been that although moral assertions 
purport to represent moral reality, they fail to do so because there is simply nothing to 
represent. This was, after all, what was supposed to distinguish error-theories both 
from moral realism and expressivism. The suggested inferentialist construal leaves no 
space for this claim, although it does retain error-theorists’ thesis that moral discourse is 
in some way defective. Whether or not this manages to preserve enough of the error-
theoretic spirit, is only for error-theorists to decide. For those who do not want to con-
tent themselves with this clipped error-theoretic construal, yet want to save error-
theories as a form of external skepticism, the task seems clear: either they must present 
an alternative to this inferentialist suggestion which can achieve everything that the 
inferentialist proposal manages to do and retain more of the error-theoretic spirit; or 
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